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The world economy is undergoing a transformation of unprecedented magnitude. According 
to Richard Freeman (2005), the participation in the global economy of India, China and the 
former Soviet Union is adding 1.5 billion new workers to the global workforce, leading to an 
almost exactly doubling in size
1. According to Goldman Sachs (2003), in 2025 the combined 
GDP of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) should account for half of the GDP of 
the G7, and by 2040 it should exceed it. In 2050, the first three economies ranked by GDP 
should be China, the US and India.   
Two features of this phenomenon stand out. Never in economic history has such a large 
workforce  been  absorbed  in  such  a  short  period  of  time.  Only  once  –  with  the  US  and 
Germany in the late XIX
th century - have two new players simultaneously risen to the top of 
the economic power league
2. It is thus hard to overestimate the magnitude of the shock.        
This accelerated  rise represents a major challenge  to the multilateral trade, monetary and 
financial system of the post-WWII era. This system was created at the initiative of the US to 
organise economic relationship among a limited number of similar and mostly like-minded 
countries. It recent decades, it has successfully expanded to absorb an increasing number of 
new  and  more  diverse  participants.  However,  the  acceleration  of  changes  has  two 
implications. First, the strains it is creating within Western societies will in all likelihood test 
the  resilience of the system  to an unprecedented degree. Second, it is bound to  shift the 
balance of global power and to call for changes in global governance because unlike their 
predecessors, the newcomers are big enough to challenge the de jure or de facto leadership 
that the US and to a lesser extent Europe have so far exerted over the system.  
This transformation is more threatening to Europe than to the US, because it has demonstrated 
a lesser internal ability to adjust to a changing world economic landscape because it is more 
likely to be relegated to second-class status, and because it has more to lose in a reform of the 
global  governance  institutions.  Furthermore,  in  recent  times  the  EU  has  concentrated  on 
domestic issues like enlargement and discussion over the project for a constitution and has as 
a consequence overlooked changes in the rest of the world. Only recently have Europeans 
heard the China and India wake-up call. 
For the US and the EU, the adjustment to those challenges probably dominates most other 
medium-term  policy  issues,  and  certainly  dwarfs  all  bilateral  policy  disputes.  A  major 
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1 Freeman considers that prior to the participation of those countries, the global workforce comprised the labour 
force from industrialised countries, most of Latin America and part of Africa.  
2 For example, in the early XIX
th century the cumulated population of the US and Germany accounted for about 
a fourth of the population of Western Europe. Furthermore, their GDP per capita was only about a third lower 
than that of the UK. In 1950, the cumulated population of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore accounted for one-fourth of that of the US, Western Europe, Canada and Australia. Source: Angus 
Maddison, Historical Statistics, http://www.eco.rug.nl/~Maddison/.      2 
question is thus whether the two dominant players of today can, in spite of their differences, 
converge on how to handle the shock, and are able to define joint responses.      
This note briefly addresses the issues raised by the rise of the BRICs and their implications 
for US-EU discussions. Section 1 deals with the economic shock. Section 2 addresses the 
challenges to multilateralism. Section 3 concludes by raising issues for discussion.   
 
1.  Globalisation fatigue   
The almost sudden increase in the world labour supply implied by the inclusion of the BRICs 
in the global economy is bound to have profound consequences on wages, employment and 
the distribution of income. Freeman reckons that because the entrants lack the capital stock of 
the incumbents, the global capital-labour ratio has been cut by close to 60% and will only 
attain its previous level again in 30 years, in spite of the very high saving and investment rates 
in China and the other entrants. This a major reason for the downward pressure on wages and 
the increase in the global return on capital that are being felt in the countries that previously 
constituted the world economy.  
The magnitude of the shock is compounded by the increasing ability of global companies to 
decompose  the  value  chain  and  to  outsource  whatever  segment  of  it  to  where  it  can  be 
produced in a more cost-effective way.   
Furthermore, the entrants are relatively well-endowed in human capital. This certainly is true 
for Russia and India, as well as for China which is investing massively in higher education 
(by 2010, its annual output of science and technology PhDs should match that of the US). The 
initial pattern of comparative advantage and trade is thus shifting rapidly. As Paul Samuelson 
(2004) emphasised in a recent (and controversial) paper, this erosion of the rich countries’ 
traditional  comparative  advantage  in  skill-intensive  goods  is  not  only  likely  to  alter  the 
distribution of income. It could also lead to a decrease in the gains from trade and therefore to 
a net loss for the incumbents.   
This transformation is taking place against the background of mounting signs of globalisation 
fatigue. A decade or so after the process started to accelerate, it affects both Europe and the 
US.  
In Europe (at least in part of it), persistently high unemployment and dysfunctional labour 
markets make the adjustment to shocks especially painful as laid-off workers from major 
companies face the perspective of protracted unemployment and significant income losses. 
The  angst  over  globalisation  and  relocations  recently  found  a  political  expression  in  the 
French rejection of the constitutional referendum.  
What is more surprising is that in spite of a lower unemployment rate, a better functioning 
labour market and an established comparative advantage in innovation, a somewhat similar 
climate exists also in the US, as indicated by current congressional nervousness vis-à-vis 
China over trade, offshoring, currency controversies and the take-over of US companies. For 
the EU, the uncomfortable message is that even a Europe that had gone through its painful 
reform agenda and succeeded in becoming an innovation-based economy would not escape 
the strains of adjustment.         
To avoid the transformation of globalisation fatigue into a real backlash, the US and the EU 
need to go beyond mere sermons on the benefits of open trade and the imperative of structural 
reforms.  Required  adjustments  need  to  be  buttressed  by  labour  market  institutions  that 
effectively equip employees for change and by public policies that channel part of the gains 
from trade to those institutions.    3 
An example of such institutions, albeit of limited effectiveness, is the US Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) programme that was established in 1974 and reformed in 2002 to provide 
assistance to displaced workers. No such programme exists in Europe. The EU assists regions, 
not workers, and it finds itself in the uncomfortable situation of advocating market opening 
without having an effective instrument for compensating those who lose out in the process. 
This is why it has been proposed to establish a kind of TAA that would supplement national 
efforts to retrain displaced workers and accompany their search for a new job (Sapir, 2004).  
What is clear in any case is that political support for open trade and multilateralism can no 
longer be taken for granted. 
 
2.  Challenges to multilateralism 
Support  for  the  multilateral  order  is  not  only  being  weakened  by  the  magnitude  of  the 
challenges  that  developed  and  developing  societies  face.  This  support  is  also  being 
undermined by a rise of regionalism that affects trade and finance.  
In the trade field, the rise of regionalism is impressive. Since the World Trade Organisation 
was  created  10  years  ago  to  strengthen  multilateralism,  the  number  of  regional  trade 
agreements has doubled. With 40 new such agreements notified to the WTO in 2004 alone, 
the trend is accelerating. Today, an average WTO member belongs to 5 regional arrangements 
and the EU alone has such agreements with more than 100 countries in the world
3.   
The BRICs cannot be held responsible for this transformation, but they are actively taking 
part in it. Brazil has promoted the Mercosur, explicitly taking example on the EU. Russia has 
been busy recreating links with countries of the former Soviet Union. Together with Japan, 
Korea and the ASEAN countries, China has created the ASEAN+3 grouping. Even India, one 
of the staunchest supporters of the multilateral system, is now part of the regional game – at 
least because remaining outside of it would have involved excessive risks.  
As regards natural resources, the BRICs are already exerting a significant pressure on global 
markets, which is only expected to increase. They already account for about 18% of world oil 
demand and this proportion is expected to rise to 30% in twenty  years (Goldman Sachs, 
2004). China is increasingly keen on securing access to natural resources through (mostly 
bilateral) special arrangements and the take-over of energy companies.  
In the financial and monetary fields, the BRICs and especially China have taken the lead. One 
of the major lessons that the Asian countries have drawn from the 1997-98 crisis is that they 
should avoid going to the International Monetary Fund again. Beyond accumulating reserves 
to build-up their own, national insurance against shocks, the Asian countries have started 
developing regional cooperation and mutual assistance schemes. After the 1997 project for an 
Asian  Monetary  Fund  had  been  abandoned at  the  insistence  of  the  US  and  the  EU  who 
regarded it as an intolerable threat to the IMF, less formal but nevertheless effective forms of 
cooperation  have  been  put  in  place  such  as  the  ASEAN+3  surveillance  process  and  the 
Chiang  Mai  monetary  and  exchange  rate  cooperation  initiative.  While  less  formal,  these 
agreements come increasingly close to what an Asian Monetary Fund could have achieved.  
Regionalism is thus today a fait accompli that is here to stay. The question is whether it can 
peacefully and constructively cohabit with multilateralism or is rather bound to undermine it 
and  ultimately  conflict  with  it.  The  key  issue  in  this  respect  is  what  countries  consider 
guarantees  their  security  best.  The  very  concept  of  a  multilateral  system  rests  on  the 
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assumption  that  security  is collective.  According  to  this  concept  access  to  raw materials, 
products, services and capital is guaranteed by the depth and resilience of the corresponding 
markets and by the rules governing the multilateral institutions. For example, energy security 
rests on the depth and liquidity of a global market and on a global governance that prevents 
manipulation, rather than on costly self-insurance or on bilateral deals which are subject to 
renegotiation. In the same vein, financial security rests on the depth and liquidity of global 
financial markets and on the potential for accessing on reasonable conditions to IMF loans, 
rather than on special arrangements with a subset of countries. A multilateral system is thus 
strong  as  long  as  the  participating  countries  have  sufficient  trust  in  it to  consider  that  it 
represents a form of insurance they would be able to rely on if needed.     
The evidence is that at least China does not trust the concept of collective security very much. 
This is certainly in part due to its size: a country big enough to create major imbalances on 
global  markets  can  hardly  rely  on  the  assumption  that  those  markets  will  always  have 
sufficient depth to provide the liquidity it may lack. But lack of trust is also attributable to the 
governance of the multilateral system, which is still formally (for the G7 and the IFIs) or 
informally (for the WTO) dominated by the US and to a lesser extent the EU
4. While a 
noticeable progress was made a few years ago with the creation of the G20, the lack of reform 
of the global institutions (or the slow pace of it) acts for it, and possibly for the other BRICs, 
as an incentive to explore alternative, bilateral or regional routes.  
The reform of the global economic and financial institutions and the rebalancing of power it 
implies are not simply required for the sake of fairness. More importantly, they are necessary 
to ensure a sufficient degree of ownership in the multilateral system. Rather than to postpone 
them, the US and the EU should thus accelerate reform to create conditions for a strong 
commitment to multilateralism.  
Such a rebalancing necessarily implies that Europe abandons its current overrepresentation in 
the G7 and the Bretton Woods institutions to make room for a governance structure that better 
represents the world economy of today and tomorrow. In turn, this implies some form of 
pooling of representation in global institutions, especially those where membership is limited. 
This  perspective  has  been  discussed  for  some  time  among  Europeans,  but  without  much 
follow-up. External pressures might lead to consider it more seriously.  
3. Conclusions 
This paper has argued that one of the biggest difficulties ahead for the US and Europe is to 
handle the integration into the world economy and the global multilateral system of the new 
entrants – i.e., mainly the BRICs. This is a major challenge that deserves to be addressed 
jointly by the US and the EU.  
The challenge has internal as well as global dimensions. On the internal front, Europe and the 
US are already suffering from globalisation fatigue, but they are bound to be confronted with 
increasing stress as a consequence of the doubling of the world economy’s global labour 
supply. The questions to discuss in this regard are (i) how support for open markets can be 
maintained against the background of deeper and more widespread economic strains, and (ii) 
whether this can be addressed without scaling up very significantly efforts to assist displaced 
workers and make them able to cope with change. Little has been done so far to address those 
issues.  
On the global front, the issues are (i) whether sufficient backing for an already weakened 
multilateral system can be maintained if economies increasingly tend to rely on unilateral, 
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bilateral or regional schemes to insure against potential real and financial shocks, and (ii) 
what  changes  in  the  governance  of  the  international  institutions  are  required  to  make 
additional room for the newcomers, ensure that they feel adequately represented, and give 
them incentives to develop a sense of ownership in this system.    
Until recently, the common perception was that those issues would need to be addressed in 
the medium run. It is increasingly apparent that they need to be taken up without delay.   
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